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Abstract—Proliferation of IoT devices in society demands a
renewed focus on securing the use and maintenance of such
systems. IoT-based systems will have a great impact on society
and therefore such systems must have guaranteed resilience.
We introduce cryptographic-based building blocks that strive to
ensure that distributed IoT networks remain in a healthy con-
dition throughout their lifecycle. Our presented solution utilizes
deterministic and interlinked smart contracts on the Ethereum
blockchain to enforce secured management and maintenance for
hardened IoT devices. A key issue investigated is the protocol
development for securing IoT device deployments and means for
communicating securely with devices. By supporting values of
openness, automation, and provenance, we can introduce novel
means that reduce the threats of surveillance and theft, while also
improving operator accountability and trust in IoT technology.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger, Internet of
Things, Smart Contracts, Security Protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEPLOYMENT of IoT networks and computing on edgenodes have become essential for digitizing and interact-
ing with the physical environment. The expected growth of
the IoT sector is rapid [1]. Over the coming decade there will
be billions of newly deployed IoT devices. This development
introduces IT architecture changes with challenges to maintain
centralized control and proper audit trails to settle independent
forensic disputes.
Moving towards distributed systems, without centralized
control, makes security-by-design crucial. Current IoT security
solutions often have a design based on a traditional mas-
ter/slave architecture, which also has dominated the general
IT security perspective. The master/slave architecture has been
instrumental for securing conceptually centralized nodes, i.e.
nodes directly supervised by a trusted authority. However,
distributed systems need new means to achieve trust. To ensure
trusted IoT devices without a direct supervision by a trusted
authority, built-in protocol-level control is necessary. Perhaps
most important is automating the governance of devices after
initialization.
An enabling cryptographic technology for creating a new
protocol for autonomous entities is Distributed Ledger Tech-
nology (DLT). DLTs usually assume that a community of
nodes can together ensure transaction validity. Hence, this
displaces the need for a central benevolent authority. Our
work focuses on the largest smart contract enabled blockchain,
Ethereum. However, we have aimed at creating a generic
solution, suitable for any blockchain providing smart contracts.
Smart contracts scripting statements evaluated anonymously
by blockchain peers can in our case specify and enforce
rules for access to IoT devices. Smart contracts execute on
the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Blockchain network
validators run the EVM and evaluate these contracts for every
corresponding transaction, e.g. when a contract function is
called. Antonopoulos and Wood [2] explain smart contract
design and use further.
Utilizing smart contracts as proposed, provides the complete
deployment history of an IoT device. The contract transaction
records are stored on the blockchain and can provide a
blockchain secured auditable log when the device is produced,
delivered to an owner, installed, updated, uninstalled, delivered
to another owner, reinstalled, and so on. Thus, smart contracts
enable message exchange [3]. This addresses the current plug-
and-play solution design that is often poor, offering attackers
numerous attack vectors and vulnerability exploits. Perhaps
the worst feature of the plug-and-play design is that owners
of infected systems often have no awareness of contamination
and forensic discovery is near to impossible [4]. The recently
discovered 19 different vulnerabilities, labeled Ripple20, in
a popular TCP/IP library amplifies the call for improved
IoT security protocols [5]. The vulnerability discoverer, JSOF
research lab, recommend measures that minimize the risk for
an attacker gaining complete control over the targeted device
remotely. Among others, such calls motivate our reconsider-
ation of the process for achieving secure IoT networks and
the proposal of a novel protocol, utilizing smart contracts on
a distributed ledger.
The paper has the following structure: section II discusses
related smart contract research, section III describes our pro-
posal, section IV provides a trust evaluation of the protocol,
section V presents the gas consumption associated with smart
contract instantiation, and section VI offers a discussion and
conclusion.
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2II. OTHER BLOCKCHAIN SMART CONTRACT-BASED
PROPOSALS FOR SECURE IOT DEPLOYMENT
Restuccia et al. [6] provide a blockchain-based IoT appli-
cation survey for smart energy, smart environments, robotics,
transportation, supply chain, and others. They emphasize that
results show that several IoT applications would benefit from
blockchain technologies such as smart contracts. Several pro-
posed blockchain based solutions for controlling access to IoT
devices rely on smart contracts [7], [8], [9], [10].
Anderson et al. [11] present a blockchain-based authoriza-
tion system called WAVE (Wide Area Verified Exchange) for
IoT devices. Embedded agents represent IoT devices, servers,
and gateways on the Overlay Layer. Agents and routers
interact with the underlying Ethereum blockchain through four
smart contracts: WAVE object contract, registry contract, alias
contract, and router affinity contract.
Bahga and Madisetti [12] present a blockchain-based plat-
form called BPIIoT for Industrial IoT (IIoT) where IoT devices
are machines utilized in manufacturing environments. BPIIoT
enhances the functionality of a recent on-demand manufac-
turing model called Cloud-Based Manufacturing (CBM) [13],
CBM service users issue transactions to smart contracts related
to IIoT devices.
Novo [8], [14] proposes an architecture for IoT access
management using smart contracts. The solution uses units
called management hubs between the IoT network and the
smart contracts. This is partially due to resource constraints,
to avoid having to synchronize a full blockchain node for every
IoT device. Their solution introduces an extra component in
the system that constitutes a point of centralization.
Rashid and Siddique [15] compare blockchains with smart
contract support and propose the following research directions
related to smart contract use in blockchain-based IoT security
solutions: resilience against hybrid attacks, optimal IoT system
platforms, auditing protocols, management of trust and re-
liance in social networks, energy-efficient mining, and hybrid
consensus protocols.
Biswas et al. [16] propose a scalable blockchain-based
framework for IoT systems, where a local Certification Au-
thority (CA) registers and authenticates local IoT devices.
IoT applications use a blockchain Standard Development Kit
(SDK) to create smart contracts and transactions. A testbed
setup for the proposed framework uses HyperLedger Fabric
[17].
Hang and Kim [18] propose a layered IoT blockchain
platform for ensuring integrity of data sensed by IoT devices.
Linked IoT devices constitute an IoT Physical Layer. An
Application Layer Client executes a smart contract consisting
of a function for device owner registration, a device registra-
tion function, a sensor reading function, an actuator writing
function, and an event notification to update the blockchain
ledger.
Huh et al. [19] propose the use of Ethereum to manage
configuration settings and operation modes of IoT devices.
For identification, each IoT generates a unique cryptographic
key pair and stores the private key securely. The public key
is stored as a transaction record in an Ethereum block and
addresses the IoT device. Smart contracts implement IoT
device behavior.
He et al. [20] propose a secure blockchain-based man-
agement scheme for IoT devices. Transaction records, which
can contain smart contracts, are stored in blockchain blocks
encrypted with ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
[21] and signed with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA).
Christidis and Devetsikiotis [22] propose a setup requiring
an IoT device manufacturer to provide a master node in a
blockchain for IoT firmware updates and to configure all man-
ufactured devices as nodes in the same blockchain network.
IoT devices use smart contracts to retrieve hashes of new
firmware updates from the blockchain.
Nichol and Brandt [23] propose blockchain-based device
management for enhanced reliability and security of medical
IoT devices. Pre-programmed smart contracts can send auto-
matic notifications about device service requirements to users.
III. A PROTOCOL FOR DISTRIBUTED IOT SECURITY
In our review of prior literature, we find many related
proposals that consider the use of smart contracts in com-
bination with IoT, e.g. [14] and [20]. However, we find
none that base their management process (including device
handling and event processing) of IoT networks on governance
through blockchain technology. We propose a solution for IoT
device management that, through smart contracts, enables an
operationally autonomous device, i.e. a device self-contained
by disallowing any externally initiated incoming network
connections. We achieve this firstly (1) by hardening the
IoT device to disallow any incoming connections and only
allowing certain whitelisted outgoing connections for relevant
services, a procedure that significantly reduces attack vector
risks. Secondly (2), by utilizing the Ethereum ledger as a
mediator layer that provides a task (job) queue, we allow
an owner (user) to still maintain the system and command
the IoT device/network to perform various actions. Thirdly
(3) the device understands the reporting or action backend by
independently handling either processing (incl. storing) data
or dealing with actions, e.g. through an actuator. Points (2)
and (3) further mean that the solution reduces vectors of man-
in-the-middle attacks that may occur if the protocol deploys a
centralized management node instead of a public blockchain.
Point (3) extends to an implementation that enables a partici-
patory platform for task handling, by introducing an associated
token based on Ether.
In this paper, we propose a smart contract-based secu-
rity protocol. There are other parts of the implementation,
including a React based Web-UI for interacting with the
smart contracts, and a Python application that runs on a
Raspberry PI-based IoT device and functions as an interpreter
of messages received from the blockchain. However, this paper
will primarily focus on the developed smart contract protocol.
Figure 1 shows a diagram overview of our smart contracts
and indicates important functions and data structures. The
development phase has utilized an Ethereum testnet. Any ref-
erences to Ethereum carry that scope. The contracts are open
3sourced. Any interested party can publish their own complete
contract set, thereby creating an identical but separate backend
platform. The solution requires that all users of the system
understands secure management of Ethereum private keys. If
these keys are lost or compromised, reinstallation is necessary
for related IoT devices.
A. Smart Contract Design
To achieve trust in a smart contract enabled system, with-
out any governing and trusted intermediaries, all designed
transactions must be measurable and deterministic in nature
for blockchain peers to be capable to validate them. The
implication of this is that an execution of a smart contract
should not infer dependencies to externally located data but
rather push any data needed for contract evaluation to the
ledger.
In our implementation, we utilize a design with manager
contracts that independently verify information and decide
whether a process can continue or not. We inject references to
other manager contracts via the function init, which effectively
binds them together into one coherent system with shared
data. Initialization of a manager contract is possible only after
deployment of the system. Initialization locks and prevents
modifications of static variables like contract references, the
token price, or the task fee. By utilizing the msg.sender syntax,
we limit the right to execute certain functions to manager
contracts. This is done to guarantee that necessary checks are
performed prior to the execution, which confirm that the other
manager contracts consent to the action.
Registered users and devices are stored in key-value maps
located in their respective manager contracts. The registration
requires a unique identifier for the key, while an an instance
of the respective User/Device smart contract will serve as the
value. For users, the unique identifier is the Ethereum wallet
address. When executing functions on the EVM that write new
data onto the ledger, the wallet address of the user cannot be
hidden or falsified and can therefore be a trusted identifier.
To create the unique identifier for devices, we chose to hash
a concatenation of the serial number embedded in the device
chipset and a randomly generated salt. The first execution of
the device middleware generates this identifier and stores it
locally for subsequent use. The identifier’s only requirement
is to be unique, so we implemented an easy-to-use naming
convention that makes it statistically improbable to produce
duplicates. If there is a duplicated device identifier in the
contract, then repeated hashing with another salt continues
until the generated device identifier is unique. A device owner
could also substitute our solution with any random string
that is not already in use, when registering their device. For
production use, registration may need to further disincentivize
identifier pinching, i.e. selfishly reserving identifiers that are
not needed.
All system wide functionality becomes available to regis-
tered users, except for performing actions on tasks (accepting
or completing), which also requires a registered and active
device of their ownership. Devices utilize the distributed ledger
as a generalized task (job) queue. This means the owner can
maintain or command the device to perform various actions
without being in direct contact.
B. Tokenization for Task Handling and Participatory Trust
The concept of staking, in which each peer puts up a
stake for participating in an ecosystem, has gained support in
the distributed ledger community. In this regard, tokenization
refers to using an arbitrary digital item of value, connected
to an underlying crypto coin such as Ethereums ether, for
providing a stake in the form of a token, in order to be able
to participate. Staking should not be confused with the proof-
of-stake consensus algorithm. Token staking can ensure that
all participants have something to lose if they misbehave and
therefore induces some form of participatory trust.
A task consists of two human actor (User) roles, the creator
and the respondent, and an IoT device that performs the task
on behalf of the respondent. In a base scenario, the creator
would assign a task to a known respondent and device (maybe
even their own device). We have however implemented an el-
ementary token economy, where registered users can purchase
tokens for creating new tasks and provide respondents with
token rewards for task completion. Therefore, we also provide
a task market platform that enables the creation of public tasks
for execution by any respondents device. To disincentivize
poor conduct, we utilize token staking as a hindrance for
unsolicited task creation and task pinching. The respondent
must also stake half the token reward offered by the creator
of the task, when accepting the task. This prevents malicious
respondents blocking other devices from performing the task.
This means that our system is also usable for public task
allocation and fulfillment, i.e. anyone that meets a set of
given criteria can accept such tasks. The task manager contract
provides a public registry of available tasks. Even in the base
scenario where the creator and respondent are the same, the
tokenization serves an important role by creating an immutable
audit trail of performed/failed tasks.
For further enforcement of participatory trust, every user
contract has a reputation attribute that reflects the user’s task
participation history. When a task is completed, the creator is
rewarded with one reputation point and the respondent with
two reputation points. This attribute allows task creators to
limit particularly important tasks to respondents who have
proven themselves competent, by setting a sufficiently high
reputation requirement for the task. In section 6, we outline
future research directions based on this initial implementation.
C. Task Lifecycle
Tasks are by definition transient and therefore have a
different lifecycle compared to user or device contracts. In our
proposed solution, tasks are broken down into three separate
phases. The creator actor triggers the first phase (see Figure
2) by instantiating a new task via the task manager. Another
actor, the respondent, triggers the second phase by accepting
an open task and transferring it to a device backlog see Figure
3. Submission of a valid result to the task manager by a device,
or an automatic release of an expired task, triggers the third
phase - see Figure 4.
4Device
+ Owner: Address
+ Name: String
+ Backlog: Task[]
+ Assignment: Event
+ Task_Manager: Address
+ Assign_Task()
+ Clear_Task()
User
+ Reputation: Integer
+ Results: Task[]
+ Task_Manager: Address
+ Add_Result()
+ Award()
User Manager
+ Users: Map
+ Everyone: User[]
+ Initialized: Bool
+ Task_Manager: Address
+ Fetch()
+ Add()
+ Init()
Device Manager
+ Devices: Map
+ Collections: Map
+ Initialized: Bool
+ User_Manager: Interface
+ Task_Manager: Address
+ Fetch_Device()
+ Fetch_Collection()
+ Add()
+ Init()
Token Manager
+ Tokens: Map
+ Price: Float
+ Initialized: Bool
+ Task_Manager: Address
+ Balance()
+ Purchase()
+ Consume()
+ Transfer()
+ Init()
Task Manager
+ Tasks: Map
+ Open: Task[]
+ Results: Map
+ Result: Struct
+ Fee: Integer
+ Initialized: Bool
+ User_Manager: Interface
+ Device_Manager: Interface
+ Token_Manager: Interface
+ Fetch_Task()
+ Fetch_Result()
+ Add()
+ Accept()
+ Complete()
+ Release()
+ Init()
Task
+ Creator: Address
+ Deliverer: Address
+ Device: Address
+ Locked: Bool
+ Reputation: Integer
+ Reward: Integer
+ Encryption_Key: String
+ Expires: Integer
+ Assign()
+ Destroy()
Fig. 1. Smart contract structures and API. Source code and deployment settings at: [https://github.com/wickstjo/eth-task-queue]
Multiple cross-contract verification checks precede the start
of a new phase. Any check that returns false will prematurely
abort the transaction process and instead return an error
message. The token stake that both task actors accept goes
to the task itself and remains frozen until the task is resolved
as specified by its internal logic.
To accept a task, the respondent must assign a device of
their ownership to perform it. The task manager then transfers
the task automatically on behalf of the respondent by adding
an entry to the devices backlog in the corresponding smart
contract instance. This triggers a custom event, to which a
correctly configured device can subscribe. On detection of an
event, the device will then autonomously execute the task it
has been assigned.
File storage remains an unresolved frontier in the distributed
landscape with multiple promising, yet vastly different reso-
lutions. We chose to implement a reporting backend using the
InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [24], which is a distributed
storage network that uses content addressing to fetch files
and directories, rather than their location in a file system.
IPFS borrows heavily from established torrent technology
and similarly allows its users to participate in P2P-networks
(swarms) to gain access to content other participants hosts. In
our proposed solution, all active devices connect to the same
IPFS swarm reporting backend. A device encrypts all files
produced before sending them to the reporting backend and
making them available to the network. To complete the task,
the device then delivers a task result object, including the hash
of an encrypted file, to the task manager when submitting the
result.
For asymmetric message encryption, two public/private key
pairs are required. The creator actor generates the first key
pair before creating a task and provides the public key as
a parameter for the task instantiation. After processing the
task, the device generates the second key pair, encrypts the
result using the public key provided by the creator and signs
the result using the device private key. The task result object
contains, in addition to the IPFS address for the encrypted file,
a device generated public key, which the task creator can use
in conjunction with the original private key to verify the result.
5This excludes the exchange of private keys and a compromised
key only affects a single task.
Since task contracts are destroyed after reaching their third
phase, the corresponding result must be stored in another
location. We chose to save the data of completed tasks inside
the task manager from where it can be fetched on-demand. To
notify the creator of a completed task, an entry is pushed to the
creator’s user contract. On top of functioning as a permanent
reference to the task, the entry also triggers an event that a
frontend application can listen to and create an asynchronous
visual notification for.
Task completion occurs as soon as a permitted device has
submitted a validated result or on reaching a specified block
number. Upon task destruction, the accumulated token reward
is unfrozen and distributed according to a specified ruleset.
The smart contract definition of duration to complete a task
can be a time interval or block length criteria. However, to
track the passage of time with precision on the ledger is
a problematic issue. Therefore, we chose the recommended
solution to measure time by block distance, i.e. current block
+ n blocks. Ethereums expected block interval is between 10
and 19 seconds, so a task with a block limit of n can be
estimated to expire in 14.5 * n seconds (on average) after its
inception. We implemented this feature for providing on-chain
decision clarity and to give the task creator a way to refund
the tokens from an unredeemed task, or if a respondent fails
to submit a valid result.
IV. EVALUATION OF PROTOCOL TRUST
A trust model usually evaluates IoT designs and architec-
tures. Yan et al. [25] and Sicari et al. [26] survey trust models
for IoT systems. Asiri [27] and Pietro et al. [28] propose trust
models for blockchain-secured IoT systems. Kouzinopoulos
et al. [29] present a user trust model for a blockchain-secured
network of smart homes with various connected IoT systems.
The model is a distributed application interacting with smart
contracts on a private blockchain.
Trust evaluation of our proposed IoT security protocol uses
IoT trust management taxonomies presented in [25]. The IoT
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Fig. 2. The Creator instantiates a new Task.
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Fig. 4. The task is autonomously completed.
and the distributed ledger community have a somewhat dif-
ferent definition of the term trust. Ledger-based trust is based
on a cryptographic proof and can therefore be considered as
a binary true/false value. Our trust model deploys trust in the
sense of excluded or highly improbable incorrectness, as is
normal in IoT systems design. In some cases, trust is therefore
a form of confidence. Table 1 presents an overview of our
protocols trust model in relation to current understanding of
each sub-topic.
A. Data Perception Trust
The ability to trust data recorded from a distributed IoT
device can include a focus on sensors, local caching, edge
analytics, and intrusion attacks that aim to alter data or the data
collection process. Our protocol for distributed IoT security
focuses on hardening IoT devices to disallow new incoming
connections. This hardening prevents intrusion attacks from a
distance on IoT devices [30].
Outliers represent faults in data gathered from IoT devices
[31]. An outlier is an unexpected deviation from a maintained
average. Our protocol checks that the values of data items
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TRUST MODEL OVERVIEW
CONCEPT DESCRIPTION IMPLEMENTATION
Data perception trust Trusted computing, intrusion prevention IoT devices hardened to disallow incoming connections
Device fault detection Outlier detection as unexpected deviations from maintained averages
Identity trust and privacy preservation Identification of users and devices Ethereum based authentication
Zero trust model Authentications and transactions logged on the Ethereum ledger
Privacy No personal data stored on the public Ethereum ledger
Privacy preservation End-to-end encryption of transmitted data
Transmission and communication trust Not eavesdropped, not modified Lightweight symmetric encryption of transmitted data
Only authorized communication Asymmetrically encrypted encryption key exchange, digital signatures
Tokenized protection Token staking in transfer of tasks and task execution results
Unblocked communication Detection/Prevention of DoS and DDoS
Secure multi-party computation Secure computation among untrusted parties Output correctness verification, each party knows only own output
Tokenized protection Token staking of task creators, task respondents, and task executing devices
User trust Trustworthy IoT devices and services Maintained reputation of IoT devices and services
Open source software based services Publicly available service source code and smart contract code
Sufficient reputation of IoT devices and services Registration of the behaviour of IoT devices and services
IoT application trust Satisfaction of trust mangement objectives Open source smart contracts, privacy preservation, ledger syncing delegation
gathered from IoT devices are within pre-set limits. Physical
access to a device may still enable sensor tampering, but in
our system of IoT devices, encryption on an operating system
level prevents direct data manipulation attacks in most cases.
B. Identity Trust and Privacy Preservation
Ledger transactions to the UserManager and DeviceMan-
ager contracts register Users and their IoT devices. Registra-
tion instantiates and stores User and Device contracts on the
Ethereum blockchain. Ethereum based authentication therefore
creates trust in user and device identities. Identity trust is
a Zero Trust model [32] since network traffic is untrusted,
access control enforced by smart contracts verifies identities,
and inspection and logging of network traffic takes place on
the Ethereum blockchain. To ensure privacy preservation, only
content hashes and public encryption keys are stored on the
Ethereum ledger and transmitted data is end-to-end encrypted
between the device and the reporting backend.
C. Transmission and Communication Trust
Trusted data transmission and communication is authorized,
unmodified, unblocked, and cannot be listened in on. Each
transaction sender and transaction receiver generate their own
private/public key pair using public key cryptography. A
trusted transaction initiated by a sender is both encrypted
and authorized. Authorization is a signature created with the
senders private key. The public key of the transaction receiver
encrypts the symmetric key required for decryption of the
transaction [33]. Moreover, trusted management of the public
key of the sender and trusted routing in the transmission path
to the receiver are additional transaction trust requirements
[34].
Token staking by task creators and task respondents in our
protocol induces task transmission trust and trusted transfer
of task execution results. Transmission and communication
trust also require detection and prevention of DoS and DDoS
attacks [35], something we achieve by hardening IoT devices
to disallow incoming connections and using the ledger as an
intermediary between an IoT device and a potential attacker.
D. Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computations refer to parties, who do
not have trust in each other and participate in computations
with their own secret inputs. A multi-party computation is by
definition trusted when the output is correct, and each party
can receive and know only its own output [25].
We introduce a definition for multi-party computation of
management trust for two actors and a device. Token staking
of task creators, task respondents, and task executing devices
in our protocol is a multi-party computation, which induces
task management trust. In section 6 we further outline future
research for how complex task result validation can be en-
forced.
E. User Trust
User trust in IoT devices and in services using IoT devices
depends on the reputation of these devices and services.
Reputation registers past behavior of devices and services.
Ruohomaa et al. [36] surveys reputation management and
Braga et al. [37] presents an overview of proposed reputation
models. Liu et al. [38] propose an IoT node behavior-based
7trust system combining direct trust, recommended trust, and
history statistical trust. In our proposal we have primarily
chosen direct and historical reputation for user trust. Trust
in services using IoT devices also stems from open source
code implementation of such services, since any user can then
check the correctness of the implementation of such services.
F. IoT Application Trust
Trust in IoT applications depends on how well these appli-
cations satisfy trust management objectives, such as privacy
preservation, data fusion and mining trust, data transmission
and communication trust, and identity trust [25].
IoT application trust of our protocol stems from open source
smart contracts, an operating system encrypted file system, the
absence of hard-coded private user keys, private device keys
stored in operating system encrypted files, and ledger syncing
delegation to Cloudflare’s Ethereum Gateway [39]. Through
this device resource demands are lower and, compared to
a private gateway, have increased reliability by using the
Cloudflare edge network.
V. CONTRACT DEPLOYMENT, VERIFICATION, AND GAS
CONSUMPTION
The smart contracts are written in the Solidity language
and converted to bytecode using the 0.6.8 solc compiler [40].
Initial development was performed on a local blockchain for
debugging purposes, and later using Ethereums Ropsten testnet
[41]. The Ethereum community maintains a smart contract
specific software weakness classification (SWC) scheme and
registry [42]. Static analysis tools utilize the registry of
test cases to locate potential security vulnerabilities in the
contracts. To test our smart contracts the MythX analysis
tool was used [43], which could not find any of the critical
vulnerabilities listed in the SWC Registry [42].
In Table II, we present the static gas values associated
with contract instantiation, and the estimated dollar value
they represent. Per our design, manager contracts are only
instantiated once, while the child contracts are instantiated per
usage. Note that the price of gas fluctuates frequently because
it operates via supply and demand, and that calculation of the
dollar representation in Table II has used an average estimated
gas price of approximately 0.4787 USD per 100k gas.
The cost of adding a new user or device is quite negligible.
The current price of a task suggests that the immediate use
cases will be longer term subscription models or high value
tasks. Other distributed ledgers with a lower transaction cost or
corporate chains, may be better suited for low value tasks, such
as one-off measurements. As the gas cost is directly dependent
on the contract complexity, further engineering may be able
to optimize the cost structure.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we devise a novel protocol for improving se-
curity of distributed IoT devices. We explain how IoT devices
can integrate smart contract enforced security by utilizing our
protocol. We achieve an improved trust model for a reasonable
transaction price by utilizing the public Ethereum blockchain.
TABLE II
SMART CONTRACT GAS VALUES AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR COSTS.
Smart Contract Gas Value Est. Dollar Cost
User Manager 530 579 $2.535
Device Manager 1 097 206 $5.242
Task Manager 3 052 709 $14.585
Token Manager 413 560 $1.975
User 273 931 $1.308
Device 446 652 $2.134
Task 554 883 $2.651
The distributed ledger approach provides the owner with an
openness, security, and specific control of each device in
the network that would otherwise be difficult to implement.
The novelty of our research is that we have implemented a
distributed protocol that, in addition to handling authentication
and authorization for actors and devices, also establishes a
platform for task handling. Thereby any task creator can
receive input not only from their own devices, but also from
any respondents devices. Extending the protocols functionality
is still possible, but the protocol provides a clear indication that
protocols utilizing distributed ledger technology can improve
the security of IoT management and control.
The solution makes no assumptions on the trustworthiness
of manufacturers or designers of software running on devices.
Rather, we assume that trust is hard to establish in a distributed
environment. While hardening the devices to disallow all
incoming data connections to them, our solution can still offer
the interaction needed for proper utilization.
The focus of future research will be on expanding the
system and on providing a more feature complete management
functionality that better caters different contexts. Our work
has so far focused on a security protocol that includes task
handling. We aim to explore both microservice and edge cloud
use cases, including improved tokenization and task handling.
A reason to design smart contracts is to verify an objective
truth, but smart contracts are inherently bad at inferring a sub-
jective truth such as deciding on the sufficiency of a task result.
Tasks should be verifiable, with a binary true/false response
as a confirmation of its completion. For more advanced tasks
so called smart contract oracles can be used in the verification
process. Oracles are free standing services that can execute
special tasks or fetch information that is not inherently avail-
able to the blockchain validator. For example, a task instance
can via a function call to the smart contracts under which the
oracle operates, ask for more information. Although oracles
may introduce certain logic ambiguity and a centralized point
of failure, we will further investigate their use in improving
task validation and as mediators for interoperability services,
something that is important for improving participatory trust,
usability, and reputation.
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